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INTRODUCTION THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to continue and extend the Ross (1981) analysis
of comparative risk aversion along both intuitive and analytical lines. Section 2 below offers an interpretive comparison of the Ross and standard Arrow/Pratt characterizations in a manner designed to highlight their similarities and differences. Section 3 presents a strengthening of the original Ross characterization along a few different lines. Section 4 extends this strengthened characterization to the case of general smooth non-expected utility preferences over probability distributions. Thus for any risk g, the greater an individual's Arrow-Pratt ratio, the greater his or her marginal rate of substitution between the scale-of-risk parameter t and the premium level 7T about an initial situation of certainty. Although equation (3) may be used with the same level of rigor as any marginal rate of substitution in standard consumer theory (i.e. for the comparison of attitudes toward "small" risks), the key feature of the Arrow-Pratt result is that, as in the standard case, the pointwise comparison of these marginal rates of substitution (or equivalently, of the Arrow-Pratt ratios) is equivalent to the comparison of attitudes toward "large" (i.e. nondifferential) risks, as seen from conditions (A.3) and (A.4).
While the Arrow-Pratt characterization has proven tremendously useful in the theory of individual behavior toward risk,3 Ross (1981) has pointed out that the risk premium and asset demand conditions (A.3) and (A.4) are both formulated with reference to situations of complete certainty: i.e. premiums for complete insurance against risk, and the allocation of wealth between risky and completely safe assets. However, as Ross has noted, the real world seldom affords such total security: most forms of insurance typically cover only some types of risks and not others, and in a world of price level uncertainty and bankruptcy, no asset, real or nominal, can be completely risk-free. Accordingly, Ross (1981) (see also Ross (1979) ) has developed an alternative characterization of risk aversion4 which states that the following conditions on a pair of twice-differentiable risk averse (i.e. concave) utility functions U( ) and U* ( and collecting terms yields that this condition is equivalent to
It is clear that this inequality will hold for all random initial wealth distributions and ( 
A STRENGTHENING OF THE ROSS CHARACTERIZATION
Our first result (Theorem 1) strengthens the Ross characterization in three ways. The first involves dropping the requirement of risk aversion for the equivalence of the first three Ross conditions. (We are grateful to Eddie Dekel for providing us with the proper generalization of (R.1) and a proof of its equivalence to (R.2).7) The second is that, conditional upon risk aversion, the asset demand condition (R.4) is not merely an implication of the first three conditions, but in fact equivalent to them, as in the Arrow-Pratt formulation. The third extension is the most substantive, and consists of replacing the assumption of a certain payment ir in condition (R.3) with the more general case of a stochastic nonnegative premium payment.
There are several reasons for the consideration of random premiums in the demand for insurance and related problems. Since real-world insurance premiums are usually fixed in nominal terms over a period where prices change randomly, real risk premiums are invariably stochastic. Second, if premiums are tax deductible and the marginal tax rate is nonconstant, a stochastic initial wealth implies a stochastic after-tax premium payment (although regular "market insurance" premiums are often not deductible, many of the expenses incurred in the "selfinsurance" of income sources (e.g. Ehrlich Since all risk averse expected utility maximizers are "diversifiers" (see below), this theorem will follow from Theorem 2 below.
EXTENSION TO NON-EXPECTED UTILITY PREFERENCES
The argument of the previous sections as well as Ross (1981) concerned how conditions sufficient to compare attitudes toward differential risks about a random or nonrandom initial wealth were in fact sufficient to compare attitudes toward global risks. In this section we consider a different type of extension, namely from preferences that satisfy the expected utility property of "linearity in the probabilities" to general smooth preferences over probability distributions, i.e. those which are only "locally linear" in the probabilities, as studied for example by Allen (1987 
F0().
Since the higher order term will disappear in the evaluation of any differential shift from F0( * ) to F*( -), it follows that all of the local properties of preferences at F0() are determined by the properties of the local utility function U(; FO) in the same manner as in expected utility theory. For example, V(-) will be averse to all differential mean-preserving increases in risk about Fo(*) if and only if U(x; FO) is a concave function of x. In Machina (1982a) it was also shown how most of the basic concepts, tools, and techniques of expected utility analysis may be globally extended in a similar manner. Thus, for example, V( ) will be averse to all large mean-preserving increases in risk if and only if U(x; F) is concave in x for each F(*).
It therefore follows that the "marginal rate of substitution" arguments of the previous sections will generalize to the case of (smooth) non-expected utility preferences with the Arrow-Pratt and Ross ratios replaced by -U1I(x; Fo)/ U1(x; FO) and -U1I(x; Fo)/ U1(y; FO) respectively. And except for a technical modification, the global results in Theorem 1 can be similarly extended.
This modification concerns the precise role played by the assumption of risk aversion in the asset demand condition (iv) of Theorem 1. This role is not to ensure that the individuals will desire at least some of the less risky asset 2Z (in other words, that & -1), but rather to ensure that preferences are quasiconcave in asset holdings so that the proper comparative static response (iv) will obtain. As seen in the analyses of Tobin (1958, Fig. 6), Machina (1982a, 1982b) , and especially Dekel (1986), the behavioral properties of risk aversion and quasiconcavity in asset holdings are in fact independent for general non-expected utility maximizers. Accordingly, we replace the assumption of risk aversion by the following condition:12 DEFINITION: An individual is said to be a diversifier if, for all xz, z such that E [z|x] -0 for all x, his or her preferences over the set of random wealths {xZ + az}a are strictly quasiconcave in a.
In the following, the term "smooth" denotes that the derivatives UI(x; F), U1I(x; F), U*(x; F), and U* (x; F) vary continuously in F(.). Given these definitions, our extension of the Ross characterization to general smooth non-expected utility preferences is given by: ; Fo) , which by the previous inequality must be negative, so that the optimal value ai is less than y. A similar argument establishes that the optimal value a* is greater than y, which is a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
